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FEDERAL JURISDICTION-STANDING TO SUE IN FEDERAL COURT: 
THE DIRECT INJURY STANDARD-Gladstone Realtors v. Village of 
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1950's many advances have been made in the 
struggle to end racial discrimination as exemplified by the great 
volume of legislation and case law dealing with the issues of civil 
rights, fair housing, and equal employment opportunity.1 The re­
sponse to this progress has varied. Some people have welcomed 
these advances while others have merely accepted them. Many in­
dividuals have responded by devising discriminatory schemes that 
are not easily detected, rather than abide by the law and halt their 
wrongdoing. Consequently, unlawful discrimination persists. 
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood2 involved the dis­
criminatory practice of racial "steering." Racial steering is a prac­
tice whereby a real estate broker falsely represents to a prospective 
buyer that the only homes available are those located in areas al­
ready populated by members of that buyer's raciai or ethnic 
groUp. 3 Prompted by the belief that two Chicago area real estate 
brokerage firms illegally "steered" homebuyers to different areas of 
the Village of Bellwood according to their race, some black and 
some white residents of Bellwood tested their belief by engaging 
the services of these firms. The real estate firms did allegedly steer 
them to different areas of Bellwood according to their race. 4 Pro­
spective black homebuyers were shown homes only in an inte­
grated area of Bellwood, and the white buyers were shown homes 
only in Bellwood's predominantly white areas. 5 
In Gladstone, the Village of Bellwood, several of its residents, 
one resident of a neighboring town, and the Metropolitan Leader­
ship Council for Open Communities (Leadership Council) sued the 
firms. 6 They claimed that the steering violated the Fair Housing 
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Civil Rights Act of 1960, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1974-1974(e), 1975(d) (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000(e)-2000(e)(15) (1976). 
2. 441 U.S. 91 (1979). 
3. Id. at 91. 
4. Id. at 95. 
5. Id. 
6. Plaintiffs were the Village of Bellwood, one black resident of Bellwood, four 
white residents of Bellwood, one black resident of neighboring Maywood, and the 
Metropolitan Leadership Council for Open Communities, a nonprofit organization 
dedicated to eliminating housing problems in the Chicago metropolitan area. 
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Act of 1968 (the Act).7 The Act declares it unlawful to discriminate 
in the sale or rental of a dwelling on the basis of race, color, reli­
gion, sex or national origin. This prohibition extends to the terms 
and conditions of any sale and the provision of services in connec­
tion with such sale. 8 The plaintiffs charged that the firms' discrimi­
natory conduct had wrongfully and illegally manipulated the hous­
ing market in the village and had deprived the individuals of their 
rights to select housing without regard to race and to enjoy the so­
cial and professional benefits of living in an integrated society. 9 
The suit was brought under section 812 of the Act which pro­
vides: "The rights granted by sections 3603, 3604, 3605 and 3606 of 
this title may be enforced by civil actions in appropriate United 
States district courts without regard to the amount in controversy 
and in appropriate State or local courts of general jurisdiction. "10 
Section 812 is one of two courses of action open to individuals un­
der the Act. The other avenue of relief, section 810,11 provides for 
administrative resolution of housing discrimination controversies. 
Under section 810, any aggrieved person who the Act defines as 
one "who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing 
practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a 
discriminatory housing practice . . . may file a complaint with the 
Secretary [of the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD)]."12 If the Secretary decides to resolve the complaint, his 
department may do so "by informal methods of conference, concili­
ation and persuasion. "13 If HUD does not act upon the complaint 
or fails to procure a voluntary agreement through informal methods 
the complainant may seek relief in the judicial system. 14 
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted 
the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that 
the plaintiffs were not within the class of persons to whom Con­
gress had extended the right' to sue under section 812. Noting that 
none of the plaintiffs had been discriminated against in the actual 
sale of a dwelling, the court held that their injuries were only indi­
rect results of racial discrimination. It stated that such indirect vic­
7. 42 u.s.c. §§ 3601-19 (1976). 
8. 42 u.s.c. §§ 3603-06 (1976). 
9. 441 U.s. at 95. 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976). 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1976). 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1976). 
13. Id. 
14. 42 u.s.C. § 3610(d)(1976). 
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tims may be said to be included in the "person aggrieved" lan­
guage of section 810, but that they did not have standing to sue 
under section 812 which was limited to direct victims of discrimi­
nation. 1S The court expressly adopted the reasoning of TOPIC v. 
Circle Realty, 16 a case involving facts similar to the Gladstone 
case. 17 In TOPIC, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that Congress had intended section 812 to be 
available only to those persons "who are the direct objects of the 
practices it makes unlawful. "18 The plaintiffs in TOPIC did not 
genuinely wish to purchase houses, and therefore, they were not 
the direct objects of discrimination. The court reasoned that to al­
low indirect victims to proceed directly to federal court under sec­
tion 812 would destroy the statutory pattern of the Act. 19 The dis­
trict court in Gladstone did not discuss whether the plaintiffs' 
allegations of injury met the constitutional standing requirements. 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that section 
812 applied to indirect victims. 2o The court cited the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insur­
ance CO.21 in which the Court had held that standing under sec­
tion 810 of the Act should be construed as broadly as permitted by 
article III. This generous construction opened section 810 to indi­
rect victims. 22 The Gladstone court then held that sections 810 and 
812 were alternative remedies open to the same class of plaintiffs. 23 
If indirect victims were entitled to sue under section 810, they 
were also allowed to proceed under section 812. The court con­
cluded, however, that the residents lacked standing in their capac­
ity as testers and so were not allowed to plead that they had been 
deprived of their right to select housing without regard to race. 24 
The court reasoned that because the residents never intended to 
15. 441 U.S. at 93. 
16. 532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1976). 
17. Plaintiffs were a civil rights organization and various individuals. The or­
ganization sent teams of prospective home buyers of equal financial means but dif­
ferent race to area real estate firms. Their tests showed that the brokers were engag­
ing in racial steering. [d. at 1274. 
18. Id. at 1275. 
19. [d. at 1276. 
20. Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1978), 
aird, 441 U.S. 91 (1979). 
21. 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
22. Id. at 212. 
23. 569 F.2d at 1019. 
24. [d. at 1015-16. 
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purchase the homes which they looked at, the defendants' conduct 
had not deprived them of this right and they had suffered no injury 
in that regard. 25 The court stated, however, that the other injuries 
alleged by the individuals were sufficient to satisfy the injury 
standard of the article III "case or controversy" requirement. 26 
Article III limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "cases and 
controversies." The United States Supreme Court has held that 
such a case or controversy can exist only if the complaining party 
can show a "distinct and palpable injury."27 The Gladstone court 
noted the importance of the right to enjoy the benefits of an inte­
grated society and held that the deprivation of this right was a suf­
ficient injury under article 111.28 The court also concluded that the 
Leadership Council's allegation of injury was insufficient to satisfy 
article III. 
The defendants sought review in the United States Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court, noting the importance of the standing 
questions raised under the Act and the conflicts between Glad­
stone, TOPIC and Trafficante, granted certiorari29 and affirmed 
the decision of the appellate court. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
Before any party can bring suit in federal court, he must 
satisfy the standing to sue requirements. In Gladstone the Su­
preme Court explained that these requirements consist of the con­
stitutional requirement of injury in fact and prudential standing 
rules promulgated by the federal courtS.30 Prudential rules are 
those not mandated by the constitution but which the federal 
courts have developed over the years to help resolve standing is­
sues and limit access to federal court~ Among these rules are the 
requirements that the plaintiff allege an injury peculiar to him­
self,31 and that he assert his own legal interests. 32 Also, these in­
terests must be arguably within the zone of interests intended to 
be protected or regulated by the relevant statute. 33 Because these 
prudential rules are not constitutionally mandated, Congress has 
25. [d. 
26. [d. at 1016-17. 
27. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). 
28. 569 F.2d at 1016. 
29. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 436 U.S. 956 (1978). 
30. 441 U.S. at 99-100. 
31. 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
32. [d. at 498. 
33. Data Processing Servo Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1969). 
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the power to dispense with them and grant statutory standing to 
persons who do not satisfy the rules when such a grant will effectu­
ate congressional policy.34 Congress cannot grant standing to some­
one who does not meet the constitutional requirements. 35 
The Gladstone opinion is effectively divided into two parts. In 
the first part, the Court determined that, in passing the Act, Con­
gress intended to define standing under section 812 as broadly as 
permitted by the Constitution. The second part of the opinion sets 
out the Court's finding that the village and the individual residents 
did meet the constitutional requirements. 
A. Standing Under Section 812 
In the first part of the opinion, the Court held that the ab­
sence of the "person aggrieved" language from section 812 did not 
mean that section contemplated a more restrictive class of plaintiffs 
than section 810. 36 Section 812 provided only for enforcement of 
rights granted by other sections of the Act. The defendants argued 
that the right to enjoy the benefits of an integrated society had not 
been expressly granted by the Act, and therefore, the individual 
plaintiffs could not sue under section 812.37 The Court held, how­
ever, that the right to be free from direct discrimination may have 
been violated with respect to actual prospective buyers and that 
the individual plaintiffs had been injured as a result of this action. 
It was sufficient that the defendants had violated someone's rights, 
and as a result, that the plaintiffs had been injured. 38 
The Court's decision upheld the Act's enforcement scheme. 
The Court found that Congress had always intended all plaintiffs to 
have direct access to the courts, and that the administrative rem­
edy had been added later as an option for those who desired it. 39 
The Court also declined to accept the defendants' argument that 
Congress intended to restrict direct access in an attempt to reduce 
the potential for harassment, and that if section 812 was open to all 
plaintiffs, no party would use the administrative remedies available 
under section 810. 40 Thus, the Court ruled that Congress had 
intended to dispense with all prudential standing rules in cases 
34. 441 U.S. at 100. 
35. ld. 
36. ld. at 102. 
37. ld. at 103 n.9. 
38. ld. 
39. ld. at 106. 
40. ld. at 103-04 n.ll. 
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brought under the Act. Accordingly, the plaintiffs needed only 
to meet the requirements of article III to have standing under 
the Act.41 
B. Constitutional Standing Requirements 
The second part of the opinion dealt with whether the village 
and the residents met the article III requirements. In order to 
satisfy article III, a party must show that he "suffered some actual 
or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of 
the defendant. "42 
The village alleged that the defendants' conduct had wrong­
fully altered its housing market. Such action could have the effect 
of deflecting prices downward and diminishing the municipality's 
tax base. The individual residents of the affected area alleged a 
deprivation of their right to enjoy the social and professional bene­
fits of living in an integrated society. Both of these allegations of 
injury were held to be sufficient to satisfy article 111.43 
The complaints had alleged that only a portion of Bellwood 
would be injured by the defendants' actions. The two individual 
plaintiffs who did not reside in that area were denied standing be­
cause they had not made a sufficient showing of injury. 44 
III. THE INJURY REQUIREMENT 
As evidenced by the Gladstone decision, satisfying the stand­
ing requirements is the first major hurdle facing a party who seeks 
relief in the federal court system. Unless a party meets the stan'd­
ing requirements he is prohibited from pleading his case. The 
Gladstone opinion embodies two distinct facets of the law of stand­
ing. The first part of the opinion recognizes a relatively recent 
trend in standing cases toward an emphasis on statutory interpreta­
tion and Congress' power to grant standing. 45 The second part rec­
ognizes that Congress cannot grant standing to a party who does 
4l. Id. at 109. 
42. Id. at 99. 
43. Id. at U5. 
44. The Court noted that the complaints alleged no injury to the area in which 
these two plaintiffs resided. Id. at U2 n.25. There was no allegation that people 
residing outside the affected area of Bellwood had been deprived of their rights to 
live in an integrated society. The Court stated that it would not foreclose considera­
tion of their standing if, on remand, the district court allowed them to amend their 
complaints to include allegations of actual injury. Id. 
45. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL 
L. REV. 663, 665 (1977). 
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not meet the article III injury in fact requirement. The injury re­
quirement is one of the oldest principles of the law of standing to 
sue in federal court. Although numerous approaches to the stand­
ing problem have been advocated over the past two decades, only 
injury in fact seems to have been consistently applied. 46 This arti­
cle analyzes the injury aspect of the standing requirements, its ori­
gins, its purposes and its faults. The conclusion of the article sug­
gests an alternative standard that allows more willing and able 
plaintiffs to seek relief in federal court, and at the same time, ac­
complishes the goals of the injury requirement. 
A. Origin 
It has been recognized since the early days of our judicial sys­
tem that review in the federal courts is limited to controversies be­
tween opposing parties. 47 The concept of standing as a distinct ele­
ment of the case or controversy clause arose out of the case of 
Frothingham v. Mellon. 48 In Frothingham, the plaintiff sought to 
enjoin the federal government from giving funds to states which 
adopted programs to combat infant and maternal mortality. The 
United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not have 
standing because she could not allege a sufficiently direct injury. 49 
She could not prove that she suffered in a manner different from 
any other member of the general public. 50 In the absence of such 
an injury there could be no case or controversy under article III. 
Justice George Sutherland's opinion does not clearly explain the 
derivation of this injury requirement. Despite its cloudy origin, the 
injury requirement has consistently been applied by the courts, al­
though the decisions have been contradictory in other respects. 
The Court once held that the injury must be to a legal right, 51 but 
this distinction was later abandoned. 52 The Court has mandated 
that the injury must be distinct and not one shared by the general 
public. 53 Later, the Court held that it made no difference whether 
46. Note, Standing: A Key to Flexible Jurisdiction-The Aftermath of Warth v. 
Seldin, 9 Sw. U.L. REV. 1247, 1259 (1977). 
47. Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892); Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 368 (1803). 
48. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
49. [d. at 487-88. 
50. [d. at 487. 
51. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. U8, 137 (1939). 
52. Data Processing Servo Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970). 
53. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). 
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the Injury was shared by the general public. 54 In all cases injury 
had to be alleged. 
In 1939 Justice Felix Frankfurter asserted that the concept of 
standing and the injury requirement were mandated by the Consti­
tution. 55 Injury in fact is not mentioned specifically in the Consti­
tution, nor for that matter, is the concept of standing. 56 Neverthe­
less, Justice Frankfurter asserted that it was implied in the case or 
controversy clause of article 111.57 It was Justice Frankfurter's posi­
tion that the framers of the Constitution expected the courts to 
look to English legal practice for elucidation in defining the case or 
controversy clause. Justice Frankfurter stated that the English 
courts, as they existed at the time of the framing of the Constitu­
tion, required a showing of injury before a suit could be brought. 
He concluded that the framers intended such a requirement when 
they inserted the case or controversy clause. 58 
Raoul Berger, a renowned constitutional scholar, contends that 
Frankfurter was mistaken. 59 Berger's research shows that, in some 
cases, the English courts allowed suits by strangers without a 
showing of injury. These suits could be brought under the ancient 
writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari. 60 Under these writs 
suits could be brought to review administrative functions,61 compel 
elections,62 and "to prevent disorder . . . on all occasions where 
the law has established no specific remedy and where in justice 
and good government there ought to be one. "63 Berger concludes 
54. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973). 
55. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (separate opinion). Justice 
Frankfurter reiterated this theory twelve years later in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee 
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (concurring opinion). 
56. Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Require­
ment?, 78 YALE L.J. 816,818 (1969). 
57. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939). 
58. Id. 
59. Berger, supra note 56. 
60. Berger uses these writs as examples of situations in which someone who 
did not satisfy the requirement of locus standi could bring suit. All of these writs in­
volve the actions of government officials. A writ of prohibition may be used to halt 
an excess of power, as when an official attempts to act beyond the limits of his 
power or when a court goes beyond its jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari can be used 
to halt any abuse of power. A writ of mandamus, unlike the other two, is not a re­
straint on power but is used to compel action by one who has a duty to act. A court 
would act on these writs whether or not a party satisfied the requirements of locus 
standi. Id. at 821 n.31 (citing Regina v. Thames Magistrate's Ct. ex rel. Greenbaum 
[1957] Local Gov't Rep. 129, 132, 135-36). 
61. Id. at 821. 
62. Id. at 824. 
63. Id. at 825 (citing Rex v. Barker, 97 Eng. Rep. 823, 824-25 (1792)). 
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that the concept of standing and injury advocated by Justice Frank­
furter had no counterpart in the English legal system at the time of 
the framing of the Constitution and, in .any event, such a concept 
was not familiar to the framers. 64 
B. 	 Analysis of the Injury Requirement: 
Its Goals and Its Failures 
In order to evaluate accurately the injury in fact requirement, 
one must examine the purposes which the rule is intended to 
serve. It is a safeguard against advisory opinions, it minimizes the 
caseload of federal courts, and it ensures that the controversy is 
presented in a form capable of judicial resolution. 
The injury requirement has been defended by the argument 
that it guards against the giving of advisory opinions by the 
courtS. 65 An advisory opinion is a legal opinion handed down by a 
court, concerning a hypothetical matter, which has no binding 
force or effect. It is merely the opinion of a judge as to what the 
finding of the court would be if that matter came before the court 
in an actual case. Generally, the goal of a party who requests an 
advisory opinion is to determine what the current status of the law 
is on a particular issue. The court uses the injury requirement to 
avoid giving an advisory opinion by stating that since the party has 
not yet been injured, he may not ask the court for an opinion on 
the matter. He must proceed in ignorance of the law, and if an in­
jury is sustained, he may then ask the court for a determination of 
the issue. Although the injury requirement may serve to keep the 
court dockets clear for only justiciable cases, this is not the primary 
purpose of the rule against advisory opinions. The primary purpose 
of the rule, as Berger points out,66 is to prevent the Supreme 
Court from giving Congress or the President advice about the con­
stitutionality of legislation or other matters before those matters are 
acted upon by those branches of government. The framers thought 
that prior advice would bias the Court if it was called upon at a 
later date to determine the constitutionality of the measure. 67 The 
primary purpose of the rule has to do with our system of separation 
of powers and checks and balances, and has nothing to do with 
whether the plaintiff is a proper party to bring suit. 68 
64. 	 Id. at 827. 
65. 	 Id. at 828-29; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95-102 (1968). 
66. 	 Berger, supra note 56, at 830. 
67. 	 [d. 
68. 	 Each branch of our government has a separate function. Due to this separa­
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Another justification for the injury requirement is that it di­
minishes the caseload of the federal courts. In recent years the 
federal court caseload has increased dramatically.69 The courts 
presumably wish to devote more time to fewer cases in order to 
ensure adequate judicial review. 7o Varying interpretations and 
applications of the injury requirement and conceptual difficulties 
inherent in defining an injury only cause the legal community 
more confusion, which results in a multitude of suits which present 
standing questions to be answered. In this way the rule is self­
defeating. 71 
The injury requirement has also been defended on the basis 
that it ensures that the challenge will be made "in a form historic­
ally viewed as capable of judicial resolution. "72 The Court has 
stated that the requirement of injury ensures the existence of that 
concrete adverseness between the parties that guarantees "that the 
questions will be framed with the necessary specificity, that the is­
sues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that the 
litigation would be pursued with the necessary vigor. . . . "73 
The injury requirement does not ensure specific framing of is­
sues, nor is the injury requirement the only way to ensure the nec­
essary adverseness. A judge cannot tell in advance, by examining 
the status of the parties, how the issues will be framed. Problems 
relating to the formulation of issues raised by the pleadings may be 
adequately resolved by means of a pre-trial conference. 74 Cases in 
tion, each branch may act as a check upon the other. If the United States Supreme 
Court were to give prior advice to the legislature, the Court would become part of 
the legislative branch; in effect, it would be writing legislation. The potential preju­
dice of the Court in favor of legislation which it had helped write would erode our 
system of checks and balances. [d. at 830-31 (citing Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (1 Dall.) 
14, 18 (1800)). 
69. The number of cases filed in the courts of appeals has increased 486.7% 
since 1940; there was also a sizable increase in 1979 over the figures reported for 
1978. In the district courts, the number of civil cases filed has increased 345.3% 
since 1940, 77.1% since 1970, and 11.5% since 1978. Criminal cases filed in the Dis­
trict Courts exhibited a 9.2% decrease attributable to a number of factors. These in­
creases have occurred despite the fact that an increasing workload is being handled 
by federal magistrates. See [1979] ANN. REP. DIRECTOR AD. OFF. UNITED STATES 
COURTS, at 2-11. 
70. Clark, A Commentary on Congestion in the Federal Courts, 8 ST. MARY'S 
L.J. 407 (1976). 
71. Wolff, Standing to Sue: The Capricious Application of the Direct Injury 
Standard, 20 ST. LOUIS UNlV. L.J. 663,664 n.13 (1976). 
72. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). 
73. [d. at 106. 
74. Adequate formulation of issues is one of the tasks that can be and is in­
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which there is no measure of adverseness, when the parties are 
willing to spend their time and money for a nonmeritorious suit, 
may be disposed of under the rules of "ripeness"75 and the rules 
against collusive suits. 76 Assuming that some level of adversity does 
exist, the injury requirement is an inaccurate barometer of the nec­
essary level of adversity.77 Certainly there are other interests 
deemed not to be "injuries" which would assure adversity as much 
as, if not more than, some of the slight injuries deemed to be suffi­
cient by the courtS. 78 The absence of injury does not necessarily 
mean the suit will not be contested with the necessary vigor. The 
attorneys are still subject to the same code of professional responsi­
bility and fear of malpractice suits as they are when their clients 
have suffered injury. These standards ensure that the attorney pro­
vides his client with vigorous representation throughout the litiga­
tion. As for the parties, the expense, time and trouble involved in 
bringing a lawsuit in federal court will presumably dissuade frivo­
lous suits. 79 
To summarize, the Supreme Court has stated that the injury 
requirement is mandated by the case or controversy clause of arti­
cle III, but research has cast doubt upon that proposition. The in­
jury requirement is presently used to serve many purposes. There 
are other means of dealing with these problems which the injury 
requirement is supposed to solve. In fact, it is unsuitable for some 
tended to be accomplished in the pre-trial conference provided for in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
75. Ripeness refers primarily to the time when the suit is brought. When the 
real issue in the case depends upon some contingent future event, the courts prefer 
to wait for that future event. It will then be easier to evaluate the practical merits of 
the positions of each party and the controversy will no longer be ill-defined. See 
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947). 
76. The courts have a duty to dispose of a case in which "the public interest 
has been placed at hazard by the amenities of the parties to a suit conducted under 
the domination of only one of them." United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 
(1943) (per curiam). Neither will the courts accept a suit where both sides argued 
and agreed. See Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47 (1971); 
Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. 251, 254 (1950). 
77. Where no adversity exists, the suits may be disposed of under the rules of 
ripeness and the rules against collusive suits. See notes 75 & 76 supra. Where there 
is adversity, the injury requirement is an inadequate measuring stick. See notes 
72-76 supra & notes 78-105 infra and accompanying text. 
78. See notes 98-100 infra and accompanying text. 
79. Once a party has invested time and money in a lawsuit, this expenditure 
would serve to motivate him to carry through with the litigation, at least as much as 
the injury in SCRAP. See generally Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Func­
tional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973). 
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of the purposes for which it is used. 80 What makes the require­
ment even more undesirable is that the courts have applied it in 
varying forms that suggest no real consistency. A survey of recent 
cases will illustrate this point. 
e. 	 Recent Cases Interpreting Standing to Sue: 
The Injury Requirement and Other Criteria 
In the early development stages of the standing doctrine the 
Supreme Court held that in order to acquire standing the plaintiff 
was required to allege an injury to a legal right, "one of property, 
one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion 
or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege."81 In Baker 
v. Carr,82 the Supreme Court abandoned these requirements. The 
Court stated that the article III requirements were satisfied if the 
party alleged a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. 83 
This personal stake would "assure that concrete adverseness which 
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely 
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. "84 
In 1970 the Court returned to the restrictive requirement of 
injury. In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. 
Camp,85 the Court stated that it was necessary for the plaintiff to 
make a showing of injury. The Court did not demand that the in­
jury be to a legal interest as defined in earlier cases. 86 The Court 
held that the injury must be to an interest that is at least arguably 
within the zone of interests intended to be protected by the rele­
vant statute. 87 The plaintiff in Data Processing sought standing un­
der the Administrative Procedure Act. 88 Therefore, they had to 
show that the interests they sought to protect were intended to be 
protected by that Act. 
80. The injury requirement is not effective in diminishing the caseload of the 
federal courts nor in adequately assuring adverseness. The injury requirement also 
rejects cases under the guise of the prohibition against advisory opinions. See notes 
65-79 supra and accompanying text. 
81. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. U8, 137 (1939). 
82. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
83. Id. at 204. 
84. Id. 
85. 	 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
86. See note 81 supra and accompanying text. 
87. 	 397 U.S. at 153. 
88. The Administrative Procedure Act proVides for suit by anyone who is ad­
versely affected or aggrieved by the actions of a federal agency. 5 U.S.C. § 702 
(1976). 
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In cases arising under the Constitution the Court has imposed 
more demanding criteria. In Linda R. S. v. Richard D. ,89 the 
mother of an illegitimate child sued to force the district attorney to 
prosecute the child's father for failure to contribute support. The 
mother alleged that the state's practice of enforcing the law only 
against the fathers of legitimate children was a violation of her 
equal protection rights. The Court required the mother to make a 
showing of injury and a showing that the injury was caused by the 
state's actions. Although the mother could show that she was in­
jured by the lack of support payments, she could not show that this 
resulted from the state's practice of nonenforcement against the fa­
thers of illegitimate children. 90 The Court further refined this test 
in Warth v. Seldin. 91 In Warth the plaintiffs were required to 
show that they had suffered an injury, that this injury was caused 
by the defendant and that the requested judicial intervention 
would adequately redress the injury.92 The Court has continued to 
follow this test, although the causation requirement has been weak­
ened somewhat. In Duke Power Co. v. Caroline Environmental 
Study Group 93 the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the 
Price-Anderson Act. 94 The defendant was an investor owned public 
utility engaged in constructing two nuclear power plants in North 
and South Carolina. The plaintiffs were an environmental group 
and several persons residing in the area where the plants were be­
ing built. They alleged that construction of the plants would cause 
them injuries and that the plants would not be built in the absence 
of the Price-Anderson Act which they alleged was unconstitutional 
on several grounds. The Court required a showing of injury, causa­
tion and what the redress could be. 95 The Court ruled that to show 
causation the plaintiff need only show that there was a "fairly trace­
able" causal connection between the challenged conduct and the 
injury.96 To establish what the redress could be, the Court stated 
that the plaintiff need show only that there is a "substantial likeli­
hood" that the relief requested would redress the injury. 97 
89. 410 U.S. 614 (1973). 
90. [d. at 618. 
91. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
92. [d. at 508. 
93. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976). 
95. 438 U.S. at 72-82. 
96. 438 U.S. at 75. 
97. [d. at 75 n.20. 
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The "causation~redressability" test is not used when suit is 
brought under a statute which explicitly grants standing. It is only 
used when the suits arise under the Constitution. The injury test is 
applied in both categories. This has led to some inequitable re~ 
suIts, as exemplified by a comparison of two recent cases, Linda 
R. S. and United States v. SCRAP.98 
In SCRAP, the Court upheld the standing of five law school 
students who sought to enjoin the Interstate Commerce Commis~ 
sion from issuing an order which would allow railroads to collect 
certain surcharges. The students alleged that increased rates would 
make it less worthwhile to ship and use recyclable goods. As a re~ 
suIt, more natural resources would have to be used to produce 
these goods. The students maintained that these natural resources 
could be taken from the Washington area which they used for rec~ 
reational purposes and that the increased use of nonrecyclable 
goods could result in more refuse being dumped in that recrea~ 
tional area. 99 The students asserted that they would be injured be~ 
cause their enjoyment of these scenic recreational sites would be 
hindered. 10o The Supreme Court was satisfied that the injury re~ 
quirement had been met. In Linda R. S., the Court reasoned that 
prosecution of the father would result only in his incarceration, and 
that if the father was jailed, the chances of receiving any future 
support was only speculative. 101 
These two cases cannot be reconciled. Surely the mother in 
Linda R. S. was as severely injured as the students in SCRAP. Yet 
the Court accepted the admittedly attenuated chain of injury in 
SCRAP, but in Linda R. S. failed to consider that the father may 
have made the support payments if he was confronted with the 
alternative of going to jail. The Court viewed the causation ele~ 
ment in SCRAP with less scrutiny than in Linda R. S. because it 
found that the students' interests were among those arguably 
within the "zone of interests" intended to be protected by the Na~ 
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 102 
The Court, in effect, is allowing Congress to decide who has 
standing by determining who has to meet the causation require­
98. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
99. Id. at 688. 
100. Id. 
101. 410 U.S. at 618. 
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976). The Court ruled that since the interest is 
protected by the statute, the plaintiff has standing under the Administrative Proce­
dure Act. 412 U.S. at 689. 
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ment. The question of causation has to do with the merits of the 
case, not the nature of the parties and their ability to pursue the 
litigation adequately.103 The Court has stated that the question of 
standing relates only to the status of the party and not to the mer­
its of his case. 104 If this is so, the causation element should play no 
part in determining whether a party has standing to sue. lOS 
IV. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE STANDARD 
Between 1960 and 1980 the Supreme Court has constantly 
vacillated between extremes in the area of standing in search of an 
equitable standard. The attempts to formulate a fair and reasonable 
standing doctrine have consisted mainly of coupling the injury re­
quirement with various other criteria. As has been seen, the sev­
eral different threshold requirements that plaintiffs ,have had to 
overcome during this period include: Injury in fact to a legal inter­
est; injury to an interest intended to be protected by statute; injury 
in fact and a showing that this injury was caused by the defendant; 
injury in fact, a showing of causation and a showing that judicial re­
lief will redress the injury; and a relaxation of the causation­
redressability elements requiring plaintiffs to show only that their 
injury is "fairly traceable" to the defendant's conduct and that 
there is a "substantial likelihood" that judicial relief will redress the 
wrong done to them. Except for a brief period in the early 1960's, 
the plaintiff has always been required to show injury. Despite 
these efforts, the Court has not been able to formulate a satisfac­
tory standing doctrine. The reason for this may be that the require­
ment of injury presents a problem. 
The injury requirement raises various problems worthy of le­
gal analysis. Its most disappointing aspect is that it denies plaintiffs 
who are willing and able to press suit access to federal court. To al­
leviate this situation, the Court should dispense with the injury 
standard as a threshold requirement. 
The Court has stated that the injury requirement assures that 
the issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and the 
litigation will be pursued with the necessary vigor. 106 This is not 
103. In his dissent in Warth, Justice Brennan states that requiring the plaintiff 
to show causation is the same as requiring him to prove his case on paper before he 
even gets into court, 422 U,S, at 528, See Comment, Standing to Sue in the Federal 
Courts: Congressional Power to Reduce judicial Barriers to justiciability, 2 WEST­
ERN NEW ENG. L. REV. 71 (1980). 
104. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968). 
105. See Comment, supra note 103, at 84-85. 
106. See note 73 supra. 
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necessarily true. Presumably, the presence of injury instills the in­
jured party with sufficient motivation to contest the suit with vigor 
and ensure adverseness. Motivation is the key. The Court should 
look beyond injury to the totality of the facts and circumstances to 
determine whether the party is sufficiently motivated. 
In Sierra Club v. Morton,107 Justice Harry Blackmun wrote a 
compelling dissent which provides a basis for arguing that a show­
ing of sufficient motivation rather than injury should suffice to 
satisfY the jurisdictional requirements. Justice Blackmun proposed 
that any party which could make a showing of a provable, sincere, 
dedicated and established status with respect to the subject matter 
should be allowed to contest environmental issues. lOS 
It would be desirable to carry this standard one step further 
and grant standing to any party who could show a "sincere and sig­
nificant interest" in the subject matter of the litigation. This 
standard would ensure adverseness much more so than does the 
injury requirement as applied in cases like SCRAP. In determining 
whether the party's interest is significant, the court should look at 
the nexus between the status of the party and the nature of the 
wrong alleged. The court could then make a determination of 
whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would be 
sufficiently motivated to institute and maintain a suit in federal 
court to redress that wrong. The court should view the party's in­
terest as falling somewhere along a continuum of interest. At one 
end of the continuum would fall those interests which can be 
deemed to be significant to all persons, such as the right not to be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. At 
the other end of the continuum would fall those interests which we 
would not expect to raise much furor, such as, affronts to one's po­
litical, moral or aesthetic sensibilities. 109 This is not to say that 
those interests which fall at the lower end of the continuum could 
not be sufficient to support a claim of standing. The court should 
look to the totality of the facts and circumstances and the status of 
the party to determine whether that party's interest is significant. 
For example, absent any extenuating circumstances, the NAACP 
could not be said to have a significant interest in preserving our 
environment in its natural state, however, an organization such as 
107. 405 u.s. 727 ( 1972). 
108. Id. at 758. 
109. This continuum of interest approach has been suggested by other com­
mentators. See Tucker, The Metamorphosis of the Standing to Sue Doctrine, 17 
N.Y.L. FORUM 911,919 (1972). 
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the Sierra Club could successfully allege such an interest. The sta­
tus of the Sierra Club as an organization devoted to this goal gives 
it a significant interest in any action which may hinder the attain­
ment of this goal. 
In addition to being significant, the party's interest must also 
be sincere. The court would determine a party's sincerity by exam­
ining what motivated his suit. The benefit the party expects to de­
rive from the litigation and any ulterior motives which may have 
prompted the suit are proper subjects for consideration. For exam­
ple, Realtor A practices racial discrimination. Realtor B may deem 
it advantageous to file suit in order to damage the reputation of his 
competitor. Realtor B's interest would not be sincere. His goal is 
not to end Realtor A's discriminatory practices but rather to impair 
Realtor A's ability to compete in the marketplace. Consequently, it 
is conceivable that his energies would be channeled in this direc­
tion. Realtor B may dedicate himself to compiling evidence which 
is extremely damaging to Realtor A's reputation but has little legal 
relevance. If this should happen, the court would not have before 
it the proper facts on which to base its decision. Moreover, once 
this evidence has been exposed to public scrutiny, Realtor B may 
be satisfied that his goal, to damage his competitor's reputation, 
has been accomplished, and therefore, may fail to obtain the ap­
propriate remedy or judgment. The court could also look to any 
history of the party's involvement in the issue in controversy, and 
how the party has conducted itself in the past with respect to that 
issue. Any evidence that the party had initiated prior suits solely 
for their nuisance value would militate against a grant of standing. 
Deciding when a significant interest exists is no more difficult 
than deciding when a party has been sufficiently injured. The 
Court's tendency to vacillate between strict and lenient interpreta­
tions of the injury requirement make that standard difficult to de­
fine. The sincere and significant interest standard is conceptually 
easier to grasp and allows for encompassing many more deserving 
parties among those entitled to bring suit. 
The courts would not be faced with a great increase in litiga­
tion. The time, trouble, and expense involved in bringing a lawsuit 
in federal court would serve to discourage many potential plaintiffs. 
Strict adherence to the requirement that any prior suits were made 
in a responsible manner would force any party to choose its cases 
with care if it seeks to achieve its goals through the legal system. 
Allowing a party who could not satisfy the injury requirement 
but did satisfy the sincere and significant interest test to litigate the 
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controversy would not mean that an injured party would have no 
voice in the suit.110 Any injured party would be allowed to inter­
vene under a broad interpretation of the Federal Rules. 111 If there 
is "sufficient doubt" about the adequacy of representation,112 the 
injured party should be allowed to intervene. This sufficient doubt 
standard was broadly interpreted in Trbovich v. UMW.113 
Trbovich involved a suit against a union alleging unfair election 
practices. A union member was allowed to intervene when the Su­
preme Court perceived that the members' lawyer, who was the 
Secretary of Labor,114 was under an obligation "to protect the 'vital 
public interest in assuring free and democratic union elections that 
transcends the narrower interest of the complaining union mem­
ber.' "115 Adequacy of representation is not necessarily correlative 
to the presence of injury and the courts have recognized this fact. 
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation CO.,116 the Supreme Court 
allowed an employee to continue to represent other employees in a 
class action after he had been hired and fired for cause and no 
longer had any personal stake in the controversy. 
The sincere and significant interest standard would allow the 
initiation of suits by groups, such as the Leadership Council which 
was denied standing in Gladstone. 117 Given the opportunity to 
bring suit on their own behalf, these parties would be better able 
to channel their energies and make full use of their investigatory 
abilities and expertise to discover and rectify unfair housing prac­
tices, and less time trying to find representative injured parties and 
persuading these parties to sue. The individual plaintiffs in Glad­
stone were denied standing to sue in their capacity as testers. This 
determination would not necessarily result from the application of 
the sincere and significant interest standard. Their concerted effort 
to discover and document the discriminatory practices prevalent in 
the area attests to their sincerity. The Court could find that their 
1l0. An injured party could join as plaintiff or if necessary the complaining 
party could have the injured party joined. FED. R. CIY. P. 19, 20. 
lli. Federal Rule 24 allows intervention when the intervenor has an interest 
in the subject of the action and when he is not adequately represented by the ex­
isting parties. See FED. R. CIY. P. 24. 
112. Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 538 & n.lO (1972). 
113. 404 U.S. 528 (1972). 
114. The Court stated that in these types of cases "the Secretary of Labor in ef­
fect becomes the union members' lawyer." Id. at 539. 
115. ld. 
116. 424 U.S. 727 (1976). 
117. 569 F.2d at 1017. 
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status as testers gave them a significant interest in the outcome of 
the controversy. 
This standard could be particularly helpful in cases in which 
the residents live in a segregated area by choice. If the residents of 
Bellwood had preferred to live in a segregated area, it is unlikely 
that the suit would ever have been brought. If the residents were 
unwilling to integrate their community, it is likely that the village 
would have thought it politically wise to accommodate the resi­
dents. Thus, the two parties who were granted standing would not 
have brought suit and the discrimination could have continued. 11s 
Often, the discrimination is so discreet that the victim never 
realizes that he has been discriminated against. 119 In other situa­
tions the victim may not sue because the time and trouble involved 
in bringing a lawsuit would not be worth the gain which would re­
sult from a favorable verdict. In instances in which the desired 
dwelling has already been sold, the burden of litigation to redress 
the past discrimination without the possibility of specific perfor­
mance might not be worth the trouble. For these reasons, a grant of 
standing to responsible groups and testers would greatly effectuate 
the policy of the Act "to provide, within constitutional limitations, 
for fair housing throughout the United States. "120 
Applying the sincere and significant interest standard to indi­
viduals is considerably more difficult than applying it to groups. 
Unlike groups, individuals do not have a readily identifiable pur­
pose, such as, the Sierra Club's interest in preserving our environ­
ment, the NAACP's devotion to achieving racial equality or the 
118. The Fair Housing Act does allow for action by the Attorney General for 
equitable relief. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1976). This section allows suits only when neces­
sary to correct a pattern or practice of discrimination or when the action is deemed to 
constitute an issue of general public importance. The Attorney General has wide dis­
cretion to decide what is an issue of general public importance. United States v. 
Northside Realty Assocs. Inc., 474 F.2d 1164 t5th Cir. 1973). It has been noted that 
which cases the Attorney General will bring depends upon his personal preferences 
and the efficiency of his staff. Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a 
Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 166 (1969). The fact that this office is under­
staffed is also cause for concern. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 
205, 209 (1972); Chandler, Fair Housing Laws: A Critique, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 159, 
195 (1973). 
119. The process of racial steering is so subtle that the victim never realizes 
that he has been discriminated against. The process itself is alarmingly simple. The 
salesman does not offer any specific information until he is certain of the buyer's 
race. He shows the buyer homes only in the "appropriate area" and tells the buyer 
that any other available homes of which the buyer is aware are in poor condition, are 
"bad deals" beyond his price range or have "just been sold." 
120. 42 U .S.C. § 3601 (1976). 
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National Organization for Women's struggle to achieving equality 
between the sexes. These groups can easily show a sincere and sig­
nificant interest in any subject matter or controversy that conflicts 
with or threatens their readily ascertainable raison d'etre. This is 
not necessarily true with individuals. This being so, the court 
should apply the reasonable person standard. The court should con­
sider whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would 
be sufficiently motivated to institute and maintain a suit.. Consider­
ation should be given to the fact that the plaintiff has in fact sought 
judicial relief. Considering the investment of time and money 
which a federal lawsuit entails, it is reasonable to assume that the 
plaintiff has weighed this factor in his own mind before instituting 
the suit and has come to the determination that the vindication of 
his interest is worth the expense. This would seem to assure that 
the party is sufficiently motivated. 121 Inability to show a long­
standing interest and history of involvement in the subject matter 
should not hinder the plaintiff's acquisition of standing. He should 
be required to show that prior involvement, if any, demonstrates 
that his suit is meritorious and not spurious. In cases in which the 
plaintiff's sincerity is suspect and no history of involvement can be 
shown, the court could, as an additional safeguard, require a show­
ing that the plaintiff had undertaken responsible efforts outside the 
courtroom, if any were available, to rectify the situation. Outside 
efforts of a conciliatory nature would tend to show that the plaintiff 
is sincerely interested in the subject matter of the suit and not in 
its nuisance value. 
The two individual plaintiffs who were denied standing in 
Gladstone because they resided outside of the affected area may 
have been granted standing under the sincere and significant inter­
est test. They need not show an injury, but only a significant inter­
est in fair housing in Bellwood, the sincerity of that interest and 
possibly a demonstration of responsible efforts to rectify the situa­
tion. 122 
Although an injured party would not be foreclosed from 
participating in the suit, it is in cases in which the injured party is 
unable or unwilling to sue that this standard would play its greatest 
role. It would open the courts to a number of deserving plaintiffs 
121. See generally Scott, supra note 79. 
122. All relevant factors that might affect the party's motivation should be taken 
into account, including geographical proximity of the two communities and whether 
the realtors were operating in Maywood as well. 
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who seek to effectuate important social policies and would assure 
that the suit would be presented in an adversarial context and "in a 
form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution. "123 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Court in Gladstone applied the traditional standing test 
which requires that the plaintiff show that he has suffered an injury 
due to the conduct of the defendant. The result was that in the ab­
sence of a direct victim, only those persons who could possibly 
have something to gain from preserving the discrimination were al­
lowed to bring suit. The sincere and significant interest standard 
would not have produced this result. 
The sincere and significant interest standard tests the party's 
motivation. It demands a determination of whether the party has 
an interest in the controversy and whether that interest is sufficient 
to ensure an adversary proceeding. This is done by scrutinizing 
both the events which prompted the party to bring suit, and his 
relationship to the controversy. The injury requirement is too strict 
a standard to use as a threshold requirement, and it too easily 
lends itself to use for other purposes. The sole purpose of the sin­
cere and significant interest test is to determine whether the par­
ties have that concrete adverseness that assures the courts of the 
effective advocacy on which they depend to make their decisions. 
Discriminatory practices have become so sophisticated that 
they are not readily discernible to the victim. There is a need to 
allow those persons who are experienced in such matters to take 
the initiative and proceed to court to put an end to these practices. 
Discrimination is repulsive to the values upon which this nation 
and our judicial system are founded. Numerous public leaders have 
exhorted the people of the United States to join together to end 
this disgraceful practice. Yet, the standing policy of the federal 
courts hinders such action. If the Court would grant standing to 
those with sincere and significant interests in halting unlawful dis­
crimination, then the burden would be removed from the often un­
knowing injured party and placed on the American people as a 
whole. 
Vernon Gorton 
123. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). 
